Several years
ago, while doing research for my book What
Killed Downtown? Norristown, Pennsylvania From Main Street to the Malls, I
interviewed an elderly man, the son of an Italian immigrant. He related to me his backstory, greatly
illuminating what it was to be poor and Italian in Norristown during its
heyday. He also, inadvertently, provided
me with an equally illuminating insight into how not just our major cities, but
also much smaller urban communities such as Norristown reacted to the influx of
African Americans after World War II.
My interviewee
had lived the American experience.
Dirt-poor in childhood and laboring under ethnic discrimination, he not
only survived, he married, raised a family and served in World War II. He had learned a trade through his G.I. Bill
benefits, and by 1950 he owned a car. Thus
empowered, he decided to join those moving to the crabgrass frontier, or sort
of. He moved just a short distance, to
adjoining Plymouth Township, but he did get the lawn and a little distance from
his neighbors that he wanted. He also,
he admitted, effectively abandoned Norristown, returning only to his church, to
which he remained very attached. That in
itself is a useful lesson, but what he did during the process of leaving is
equally so. By leaving when he did, he
became (as he remembers it) the first person on his block to sell his property
to an African American family. His
specific motives for leaving did not include racism, and thus I would place him
in that second phase of the move to the periphery, of those enabled after World
War II. What quickly followed, however,
was different. Speaking about his old
neighborhood, he admitted, “We all eventually sold to black people.” What he also admitted (off the record) was
that by the time the last white family left, the price for their house was much
lower than what he had received.
His act of
selling to a black family and what followed offers a microcosm of what we call
“white flight,” that portion of the post- World War II movement to the
periphery that was motivated by the desire to avoid neighbors of a darker
hue. This phenomenon came to national
attention during the 50s and 60s. It
struck just about every urban area of any size for which a suburban area was
coming into existence, and there were plenty of them, thanks to the followers
of William Levitt. The process itself
has been studied, with a great many results published, in both scholarly
journals and popular magazines. It was
complex and remains controversial, and cannot be summed up in a blog post.
I want to make
just one point about the first stage of this historical phenomenon, the arrival
of “the first black family” into a previously all-white neighborhood. Let’s not let any recent history (or myth)
color our understanding of what might have happened—should have happened—if our
society had actually been as colorblind as many of our elders seem to remember
it was. At this time in our history the
new African American arrivals to a previously white working/middle-class
neighborhood weren’t clutching any Section 8 housing vouchers, no federal (nor
state) programs to assist minorities, no “set-asides,” no subsidies or any other
“special benefits” with which you might be familiar. They bought the property because they could
afford to. Not only did the father have
a good job, more than likely his wife did also.
He may even have been a veteran, exercising his benefits under the G.I.
Bill just like all the others. The
family clearly had upwardly-mobile aspirations, just like all the others. Measured on an economic basis (like the one I
suggested a few posts earlier), the first African American family to appear in
a previously all-white residential neighborhood had at least as good a claim to
home ownership in such a neighborhood as did the family that was leaving. They did not represent decline in any
tangible way whatsoever.
So what
happened? Did they get the chance to
prove that they could fit in? You know,
keep the house painted and in repair, shovel the sidewalk, take in the kids’
toys at night, that sort of thing? They
didn’t, of course. They simply triggered
one or the other of those most visceral of reactions, fight or flee. So well known is the flee option that it has
earned its own niche in U.S. history, as “white flight.” Don’t let the simplicity of the term fool
you. What actually happened varied
greatly in detail.
The oft-abused
phrase “domino effect” actually seems to apply in this case (rather more than
it did to the spread of international Communism, which was allegedly occurring
at the same time). That first black family
in the neighborhood did not precipitate immediate mass exodus. But it probably did stimulate the exodus of
one or two of the most sensitive neighbors, whose departure (and sale to
another black family) would in turn discomfit the slightly less intolerant, who
would themselves decide to leave as their individual tolerance for diversity
was exceeded, and so on, in a descending spiral. I say “descending” because the only ones to
profit were those involved in the real estate transactions themselves. The process often accelerated as it
progressed, and could devastate a neighborhood’s economic value and social
cohesion in quite a short time (remember, we are talking perception here, not
reality). The result was a catastrophic
decline in the value of many (but by no means all) urban residential properties,
brought on by the departure of the very people on which any tax base
depends: working and middle-class
families enjoying ample employment.
A few managed to
profit rather well from all this (they too shall always be with us), but the
homeowners who sold, those who bought and the neighborhood itself all lost. This is the point in our urban history
when the irrational decline began, the one resulting not from dreams or
incentives, but from racism. Our urban
areas, large and small, deal with its consequences to this day. We can measure the economic loss in an
abstract way, but the personal, individual loss and the loss to our urban areas
is incalculable. We need to face this
truth without flinching, and add it to our list of reasons, making sure to mix
thoroughly, as it was in real life.
Please keep in
mind that we are simply blending this new factor into an already heady mix of
post-war yearning, government subsidies and technology-fueled
opportunities. “White flight” made its
contribution to the decline of our urban areas just as surely as did the G.I.
Bill, as both were riding the crest of a transportation revolution and an
unprecedented national prosperity, at least for a while. That national prosperity included the
transfer of wealth from cities and towns to the new suburbs, so while the net
indicators were rising rapidly, those for our older urban areas were not. Once the quickly-following collapse of
America’s urban-concentrated “smokestack industries” added its hugely negative
effects to this already lethal mix, the condition of our urban areas began a
collective descent, differentiated only by the degree, extent and the specifics
of decline.
The largest
cities were the most affected by this loss, but the example I began with shows
how widespread it was. Of the eight
towns in my lower Schuylkill Valley study group, those with the largest
population—Norristown, Pottstown and Phoenixville—experienced the greatest
degree of population replacement, in sharply descending amounts. The smallest—Royersford, Spring City and West
Conshohocken—avoided it almost completely.
Such preliminary findings require further study.
The visceral
options open to racists were to fight or to flee, and don’t let the above
deceive you for a minute into thinking that “white flight” was the only
reaction of urban residents to the influx of African Americans. There were other reactions than flight,
because not all chose to flee. Our
larger cities saw neighborhoods resort to violence and intimidation to keep out
African Americans. The towns of the
Schuylkill Valley saw little of that. The smallest managed to resist the influx of African Americans almost entirely. The larger the town the greater the influx, and the greater the flight it triggered.
There were, however, other equally disturbing
similarities, which collectively reveal that despite the hurt being so widely
spread among both large and small urban areas, for specific groups of people,
it really was all about the Benjamins, because they knew how to turn a nice
profit out of general misery. A brief look at
this, perhaps the most sordid portion of a sordid story, and at some other
techniques used to determine who moved where within an urban area, will follow when this series continues.
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